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BOOK REVIEWS

Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. Cornell Uni
versity Press, 2005, 226 pages. $45 (hardback).
MARK D. LINVILLE, Atlanta Christian College
This work serves both as a foundation for J. L. Schellenberg's own project
ed work and as a proposal for the general field of philosophy of religion.
As he sees it, work in the area needs to be placed upon a better footing,
and this is largely because of inattention to prolegomena. These include
careful analysis of several concepts—religion, belief, disbelief, skepticism,
faith—that are widely discussed but do not enjoy wide agreement, as well
as careful reflection on the proper aims of the discipline.
Philosophers of religion tend to share a basic set of assumptions—"the
received view "—regarding those aims, which are typically thought prin
cipally to involve inquiries into the meaning (e.g., coherence) and justi
fication of religious truth claims or propositions (p. 184). According to
Schellenberg, the received view is incomplete if not incorrect. He argues
that the various responses to religious truth claims (belief, disbelief, faith,
skepticism), as well as the persons who respond in one or another of those
ways, are proper objects of assessment. And there are legitimate and high
er-level aims that go beyond such assessment. For example, philosophers
of religion commonly suppose that the results of work in metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics may be brought to bear in the assessment of reli
gious conceptual systems. But what implications might religion have for
those disciplines (p. 187)? And perhaps philosophers of religion who are
concerned to evaluate religious practices and persons in addition to propo
sitions should give "careful consideration" to "the ideas of experiential
and non-truth-oriented support for religious belief" and faith (p. 188), as
perhaps either of these positive responses to religious claims may be justi
fied even in the absence of any truth-oriented support.
Further, there is a rather myopic concern only with those religious
conceptual systems that have been articulated in the past. Should not
philosophers of religion be more open to religious beliefs "that have not
yet been articulated by anyone, or made the basis of a form of religious
life in the actual world, but await our discovery" (p. 190)? (This sugges
tion may strike some as rather odd. Perhaps the time is ripe for a schol
arly tome exploring a collection of possible but non-actual religions —
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things that people might have believed but never did. One's imagination
runs wild!)
With this challenge to the received view, Schellenberg hopes to stimu
late further discussion regarding those aims and, perhaps, to rouse some of
us from our dogmatic slumbers (p. xi). His interesting and original (some
times novel) ideas and supporting arguments are likely to do just that.
Chapter one is given to an analysis of the concept of "religion." Hav
ing surveyed the literature, Schellenberg finds little agreement. Follow
ing William James and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, he notes that the term
"religion" is ambiguous between the "personal" and "institutional" sens
es, where the former refers to individual "spirituality" and the latter to
publicly identifiable traditions. He also follows James and Smith in their
contention that the personal expression is the more basic of the two. And
so, the chapter aims primarily at an analysis of "Person S is religious."
(His motive for this emphasis becomes clear later when he argues that
philosophy of religion should be concerned with responses to religious
truth claims, as well as to the religious responders, over and above the truth
claims themselves).
One potential obstacle here is the "family resemblance approach,"
which has it that, though there are typical shared characteristics among
major religions, no one combination is necessary and sufficient for inclu
sion. Schellenberg argues that even proponents of this theory may be seen,
despite themselves, to be operating with just such a criterion as that sought
in his own analysis. If it is possible to disqualify an activity (croquet?) or
an attitude (my penchant for India Pale Ales?) from being characterized as
religious, then, on the flip side, we have the means for determining what
qualifies something as a religion (pp. 10- 11).
Without claiming to have established a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for defining "religiosity," Schellenberg urges the following
common features: "(1) Frequent thoughts of a transmundane reality; (2)
an emphasis on a significant good, for oneself and others, that may be re
alized through a proper relation to this reality; (3) the cultivation of such
a relation; and (4) a disposition or tendency, when attending to matters in
which they are implicated, to . . . totalize or ultimize in some way the central
elements of features (1) to (3)" (p. 12).
For the purposes of doing philosophy of religion, Schellenberg urges
that the notion of ultimization in (4) be made central. Thus, he suggests
that a person S is religious just in case (1) S takes there to be a reality that
is ultimate, in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained, and (2)
S's ultimate commitment is to the cultivation of dispositions appropriate
to this state of affairs. He argues that all religions—including essentially
atheistic ones like Buddhism—identify some transcendent reality as both
axiologically and metaphysically ultimate, and a religious person is one
who displays a positive and committed response to such a claim. Thus,
"ultimism" is his term of choice for capturing the essence of religion.
While I think that his "technical definition" is promising, one may won
der whether the philosopher of religion (as opposed to someone in Religious
Studies) should be especially concerned with such definitional matters.
First, it is not clear to me that this bit of prolegomena has been neglected.
Three standard texts are handy to me: Peterson, et al., Taliaferro, Yandell.
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Each devotes a section to the definition of "religion." I suspect that these
are typical. Schellenberg is correct in observing that there is nothing like a
consensus here (though the differences are not exactly as the East is to the
West). Does the addition of his own definition alter that fact? Further, I am
inclined to think that whether a conceptual system qualifies as religious
under some plausible criterion is secondary to the question of whether
its essential truth claims are likely true. If the system is reasonably influ
ential, has some degree of plausibility (thus precluding, say, Scientology
and the Raelian "faith"), and is deemed religious, then this may well be suf
ficient for its truth claims being taken up for assessment. As Keith Yandell
has urged, philosophers are in the business of constructing and assessing
"categorial systems." The move to religious categorial systems is, seamless.
I suppose that here I reveal my own dogmatic slumber, and do so despite
Schellenberg's attempt to wake me.
Chapters two through six are concerned with analyses of b e lie f-re li
gious and otherw ise-as well as religious disbelief, religious skepticism including both passive and deliberate suspension of judgment, and reli
gious faith. We learn (later) that (propositional) belief, disbelief, faith and
doubt (as a suspension of judgment) are mutually incompatible. I f they
together exhaust the possible responses to religious propositions (Schellenberg entertains other possibilities in a footnote), then it follows that
one, and only one, of these responses to a given religious claim will be
justified for a given person.
As with his discussion of religion, Schellenberg observes that "belief"
has both internal and external senses: the believing states of individuals
and the propositions believed. Unlike many writers in the field -p h iloso
phers, an yw ay-his focus is on belief as a psychological state-"how it
feels from the inside to be a believ er" -becau se "such a phenomenological ap
proach can yield some important insights about belief and also about the
justification of religious and irreligious belief" (p. 41). He argues that be
lieving states have states o f a ffa irs-n o t propositions-as their object. More
to the point, to believe is to apprehend some state of affairs under the
concept "reality." Strictly speaking, our propositional beliefs are directed
at the world itse lf-n o t propositions that purport to describe it- a n d so
beliefs are "world-thoughts" (p. 50). "I am not...thinking of a proposition
and under the impression it is true; rather, I am thinking of a state of af
fairs and under the impression that it obtains" (p. 44). He adds, "conscious
believing is not self-conscious" (p. 44).
This strikes me as a plausible account of the phenomenology of belief
when considering everyday waking experiences and the often unconscious
beliefs that attend them (e.g., my interaction with students presupposes
my belief that they are present, but only rarely do I attend to the proposi
tion, "There are people present.") The plausibility stands, I think, despite
the fact that having the belief would seem to entail the conscious affirma
tion of the proposition once attended to. One is reminded of Chesterton's
observation in Orthodoxy (chap. 6) that it is easier to defend those beliefs
of which we are only partly convinced than those of which we are entirely
convinced. "Thus, if one asked an ordinary intelligent man, on the spur
of the moment, 'Why do you prefer civilization to savagery?' he would
look wildly round at object after object, and would only be able to answer
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vaguely, 'Why, there is that bookcase . . . and the coals in the coal-scuttle
. . . and pianos . . . and policemen.'"
Further, Schellenberg argues that such beliefs are had involuntarily.
There are no immediate steps that I may take to bring it about either that
I do or do not believe that my students share the classroom with me. The
belief is engendered by the experience.
Religious belief, then, is a matter of taking there to be some metaphysi
cally and axiologically ultimate reality, or, to have a world-thought of such
a reality. And religious disbelief is thus a matter of taking some state of
affairs S to obtain, where the corresponding proposition entails the nonex
istence of any such reality. Schellenberg explains that religious disbelief is
"about as opposed, intellectually, to religious belief as anything could be"
(p. 39). But belief and disbelief do not exhaust the possible responses to
daims regarding the Ultimate. The religious skeptic doubts or suspends
judgment regarding such claims. Interestingly, Schellenberg holds that re
ligious propositional faith is a variety of such skepticism. With pure reli
gious skepticism, it shares this suspense of judgment with respect to belief
and disbelief, but unlike its skeptical cousin, doubt, it involves a positive
response to the claim. Despite a lack of supporting evidence, the faithful
voluntarily represent the world to themselves as including that reality.
As mentioned above, Schellenberg takes the various responses to re
ligious claims to be mutually incompatible, and this, of course, includes
religious propositional faith and religious propositional belief. Thus, one
of the more striking proposals of this book is the claim that propositional
religious faith not only does not require religious belief, but that the two
are incompatible (p. 132). Schellenberg thinks that belief is compatible
with what he terms operational faith, which refers to a lifestyle of commit
ment, loyalty and trust. But those who manifest propositional faith "will
respond in the negative to the question, 'Do you believe that p?' and also
to the question 'Do you think it is true that p?'" (p. 137).
One important argument for this rather novel position is that, whereas
faith is widely thought to be voluntary assent and under one's direct con
trol, belief is not. Faith is a matter of intentionally representing the world
to oneself in a certain way (p. 134). Faith requires a paucity of evidence,
is viewed as meritorious, is intentionally sustained (and is vulnerable if
not) and may be abandoned at will. Belief, says Schellenberg, has none of
these characteristics. He draws support for his account of faith as volun
tary and beliefless from ordinary language and practice. People speak of
"stepping out on faith," of "walking by faith," and "taking it on faith" that
some claim is true. Such language, he suggests, is "best interpreted on the
assumption that faith is voluntary in our sense [and] provides substantial
support for that view" (p. 150).
It is not clear to me that Schellenberg establishes his case for belief
less faith. First, one may wonder whether his notion of faith as a state of
mind that may be taken up or terminated at will is either paradigmatic or
meritorious. Perhaps we move in different circles, but I cannot say that
I've encountered any mature practitioners who seemed to regard faith in
this way. Many may be found who would affirm that they believe, say, the
"great things of the gospel," but do not know of their truth with certainty.
Many more may be found whose faith is without evidential support. But
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is it common to find someone professing propositional faith in such things
while denying that they "take them to be true"? More typical, I think, is the
person who "takes it on faith that it is true," which may just be to believe
it in the absence of sufficient evidence. Even the small child, whose faith
is, not surprisingly, childlike, when asked, "Do you believe what Mommy
says is true?." will most likely respond in the affirmative. One would be
stunned to hear, "No, but I am voluntarily representing it to myself as
though it is."
And we may ask whether the apparent involuntariness of belief does
indeed put it at odds with faith as typically manifested. I do not see that it
does. There are (many) other accounts of faith and belief that accord with
the more traditional notion of faith as involving propositional belief. One's
propositional faith regarding a claim might be indirect, having as its direct
object the integrity and sensibility of someone who earnestly believes. We
can imagine active and expectant participation in a seance, say, solely on
the grounds that (a) the sought phenomenon is not thought to be impos
sible, and (b) one's believing host is highly regarded and deemed reliable.
Here, one's involuntary "world-thought" that one's host is credible would
seem to be at the core of whatever "faith" is manifested. Thus, "I believe
that whatever he believes is true." Similarly, I might come to faith on the
grounds that the faithful around me demonstrate lives of integrity and
attribute this to their religious belief. Though I do not see whatever evi
dence they seem to see, I believe on the basis of their testimony and then,
perhaps, grow into a mature faith or belief of my own. (My current belief
in the recent discoveries of molecular biologists may be analogous here.)
Or the basic outlines of some claim may just "ring true" to me in such
a way that the possibility of its being true seems worthy of pursuit. My
first inklings based upon the "starry heavens above m e"—or, perhaps, the
moral corruption that I perceive within m e—are not thus groundless even
though I may be incapable of stating a compelling case for my developing
faith. Many believers whom I have known have been in just this position.
And perhaps such believers are in this position for good reason. Alvin
Plantinga has reminded us of Calvin's account of a sensus divinitatus which,
though marred by sin, may be engaged upon an encounter with "what has
been made." Perhaps the voluntariness, accessibility, vulnerability, terminability and merit of belief are explained on a model quite unlike that ap
parently presupposed by Schellenberg. Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin Model
of warranted Christian belief consciously rejects the seemingly deontolog
ical assumptions that animate Schellenberg's discussion of propositional
religious belief and its justification. Perhaps the faithful believe in the ab
sence of public evidence precisely because their belief is basic, and prop
erly so. If Plantinga is correct, then it is possible that such beliefs are well
grounded though non-inferential. Such belief may well be involuntary in
that it follows ineluctably in the wake of what seems true to such believ
ers, but the Christian tradition seems to suggest that belief and unbelief
are a function of one's underlying moral and spiritual disposition. They
are thus voluntary insofar as we are responsible for such dispositions. Ac
cording to that particular tradition, unbelief is the result of "suppressing"
the truth (and I take it that this need not always be conscious or episodic).
Those who are genuine in their search will find what they seek, and this
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is precisely because He is not far from each of us. Schellenberg claims that
faith might be had as a result of some deliberate action that one may take.
Perhaps the action is the equivalent of opening one's eyes.
Schellenberg also appeals to a number of secular examples of what he
sees as faith without belief. A runner doubtful that he will win the race
understands that the doubt itself can lead to defeat. Never quite abandon
ing the doubt, he focuses on the proposition that he will do well. A woman
learns that there is a strong possibility that her friend was in one of the
Twin Towers on 911, but it is not certain either way. Unable to learn her
friend's actual fate, she focuses on the idea of her friend's having escaped
harm, and spends that September day affirming "So be it, so be it"(pp.
130-131). I find such examples utterly unconvincing. "Visualizing" a de
sired outcome as a device for success or serenity does not seem to me to
correspond to what is typically found in religious faith, even if, for want
of a better word, we may describe the runner and the concerned friend as
manifesting "faith."
There is certainly much room for discussion of Schellenberg's account
of beliefless faith, but, among those who see any relevance in such a dis
cussion, it is likely to meet a great deal of resistance.
More generally, one might challenge the wisdom of Schellenberg's shift
of emphasis away from the assessment of religious truth claims to that of
responses to those claims. To be sure, he suggests, "considering the chal
lenge that nonreligious responses to religious claims are rationally preferable to
religious ones should be deemed paramount" (p. 193). Those "nonreligious
responses" include either disbelief or doubt, as mentioned earlier. But un
less one is already sold on his account of beliefless faith, which introduces
a fourth possible response to the recognized set of belief, disbelief, and
agnosticism, then one might suppose that the ongoing task of assessing
religious propositions is adequate for this goal. (With the introduction of
Schellenberg's skeptical version of faith, we might look to fu rther-p erhaps non-epistem ic-grounds that would justify faith over doubt in the
case of an epistemic tie.)
Further, Schellenberg asks, "Why focus on just propositional belief or
propositional faith when your main interest is in the way of life it may
inform?" (p. 189). But one wonders whether it is, in fact, true that the "way
of life" is the concern, much less the "main interest," of the philosopher
of religion qua philosopher of religion. The person who happens to be a
metaphysician may be keenly interested in the practical implications that
his conclusions regarding free will have for, say, moral responsibility, child
rearing or the penal system. And the question of whether his disagreeing
colleague is fulfilling his epistemic duties may be a consideration should
that colleague apply to become a fellow member of the Drones Club. But as
a metaphysician, he is concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the ques
tion, "Which view gets this stuff right?" To imagine the metaphysician or
the epistemologist or the philosopher of science to perceive her task as that
of evaluating responses (belief, disbelief, faith, doubt) to functionalism, reliabilism or sociobiology is to set oneself up for parody. The concern in these
cases is and ought to be with the views themselves, and the objects of assess
ment are the ideas and their supporting arguments. Why should anyone
think that the task should be any different for the philosopher of religion?
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Schellenberg observes that there is, in fact, a body of literature focusing
on the rationality or irrationality of persons in holding religious beliefs,
and he footnotes Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief as an example (p.
178). But even the question of whether the individual believer is warrant
ed in his belief is not considered for its own sake. It is set within a more
general context: are there any good de jure objections to Christian belief?
Have we reason to suppose that Christian belief is merely the product of
some belief-producing mechanism that is not truth-aimed? In all of this, I
suggest, the real item of interest is the epistemic status of the truth claim
itself. This no more indicates a concern for the justification of responses or
respondents than does Reid's reply to Hume regarding beliefs about one's
own cranial composition. (Indeed, Plantinga argues that nearly any token
belief may be justified—and the individual justified and/or internally ra
tional-depending upon what seems true to the individual who has been
epistemically dutiful. If this is correct, then a concern for the justification
of responders and responses would seem even less grave.)
I am inclined to think that the "received tradition," which itself includes
wide disagreement, has been conducting business roughly as it ought.

In Search of the Soul, ed. Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer. InterVarsity
Press, 2005. 215 pages. $20.00 (paper).
KELLY JAMES CLARK, Calvin College
When I was a student I met a man who was a sweet, gentle, Pentecostal
Christian. He later sustained a closed head injury in a snowmobile ac
cident through no fault of his own. When he emerged from his coma, his
personality was thoroughly changed: no longer sweet and gentle, no lon
ger a Christian. He had become, through a bump on the head, a bitter, an
gry atheist. For this firmly committed mind-body dualist of the most crass
Cartesian variety (here I mean the caricature of Cartesian dualism that
bears little resemblance to the dualism of Descartes), a bump on the head
should not affect beliefs, emotions and attitudes. The mind, after all, exists
in the non-physical world and is only connected to the body temporarily
and uni-directionally—the mind rules the body but is unaffected by the
physical stuff of the brain. And I began to wonder, could this man's eternal
salvation hang upon a bump on the head (or any other physical processes
over which he has no control)?
At that time, and for a long time thereafter, I thought that THE Chris
tian view of the person, on which hung all of the Law and the Prophets,
was mind-body dualism. And to reject mind-body dualism was at best
heresy and at worse a repudiation of the Christian faith. I have since come
to believe that nothing of importance, other than understanding our na
ture as persons, hangs on mind-body dualism: not orthodoxy, not salva
tion, not moral responsibility, not human dignity, not free will, and not
post-mortem existence (after all, we confess to the resurrection of the body
not the immortality of the soul); and not, for crying out loud, forgiveness
and hospitality (this will become apparent later).

